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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
E. J. MAYHEW, 1 
Plaintiff -Respondent, 
vs. 
STANDARD GILSONI'TE COM-
pANY, A Corporation, 
Defendant;.. A ppella;nt. 
BEAVER DAM SALES COM-
pANY, A Partnership, 
Plat'ntiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
ST·ANDARD GILSONITE COM-
PANY, A Corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
I 
Case No. 
9652 
Case No. 
96:53 
RESP'O'NDENT'S BRIEF 
STATE11ENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by both plaintiffs against 
the same defendant seeking a declaratory judgment to 
the effect that contracts entered into between the parties 
concerning certain patent rights were terminated, or in 
the alternative ,,~ere and are null and void, and for other 
relief. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On February 23, 1962, the T'rial Court entered a de-
fault judgment against defendant in each case granting 
relief to each plaintiff as prayed. A subsequent motion 
to set aside the default judgment in each case was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
On appeal the defendant-appellant seeks a reversal 
of the order of the Trial Court in each case denying its 
motion to set aside the default judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant corporation entered into a contract with 
each of the plaintiffs here involved. The first contract 
with Beaver Dam Sales Company was in September of 
1956. (Case No. 9653, R, Pgs. 5-9) The second contract 
with E. J. Mayhew was in July of 1958. (Case No. 9652, 
R, Pgs. 5-8) 
During the life of both agreements the defendant was 
repeatedly in default under them. (Case No. 9652, R, Pgs. 
14, 15; Case No. 9653, R, Pgs. 19, 20) Except for a "brief 
period" in the latter part of 1960, defendant did not have 
a regular board of directors for two years prior to the 
entry of the judgment appealed fron1. (Case No. 9653, R, 
Pg. 28, lines 12-15) On March 31, 1961, the State of Utah 
suspended the charter of defendant. (Ex. 1, both cases) 
At that time R. J. Pinder was president of defendant. 
The corporation is now insolvent. (Defendant-Appellant's 
Briefs, Case No. 9652, Pg. 19; Case No. 9653, Pg. 20) 
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Both plaintiffs had served notice,s on defendant ter-
minating their agreements. (Ex. 3, both cases) 
On December 21, 1961, Beaver Dam Sales Company 
filed its complaint in Case No. 9653 with the Salt Lake 
County Clerk. Service was attempted to be made upon 
R. J. Pinder, president and only known officer of defen-
dant company. Service was not made as Mr. Pinder could 
not be found. Mr. Pinder attempted to resign as president 
of defendant on January 18, 1962. (Case No. 9653, R, 
Pgs. 23, 24) On January 30, 1962 an amended complaint 
was filed by Beaver Dam Sales Company and an original 
complaint was filed by E. J. Mayhew commencing Case 
No. 9652. On February 1, 1962, R. J. Pinder, as president 
of defendant, was served with summons. On February 
16, 1962, R. J. Pinder retained counsel to represent defen-
dant. (Defendant's briefs, page 4) On February 23,1962, 
the defendant's default was entered and judgment taken 
against it in both cases. On the same day defendant filed 
a motion in each case to set aside the. default and the 
judgment so entered. No documents other than the mo-
tion and notice of motion in each case were filed at that 
ti1ne. (R, Case No. 9652, Pg. 25, et seq.; R, Case No. 9653, 
Pg. 58, et seq.) 
The motions were set for hearing on March 7, 1962. 
At the appointed time counsel for plaintiffs and defen. 
dant were present. Discussion was held off the reeord. 
and the Court pointed out to counsel for defendant that 
there were no documents on file on which the Court could 
base a ruling in the defendant's favor. ·The Court then 
said (R, Case No. 9652, Pg. 16; Case No. 9653, Pg. 21): 
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"I think in fairness to Mr. Bradford [counsel 
for defendant] I am going to give him ten days 
to support this motion and we can hear it further, 
but I don't think you have got anything before 
the Court at this time to base this upon ... [after 
arguments of counsel] I will give you until next 
Wednesday to file with him [plaintiffs' counsel] 
and with the Court motions, whatever you desire 
further, that should support this, and we will hear 
the matter at 2:30 on the 14th ... " 
On March 14, 196·2, defendant's counsel filed an affi-
davit in each case and served them on plaintiffs' counsel. 
The Trial Court heard testimony and considered the 
record, including the contents of the affidavits, and on 
March 15, 1962 denied the motions in both cases. (Case 
No. 9652, R, P~ 28; Case No. 9·653, R, Pg. 61) It is the 
denial of these ~"'from which defendant appeals. 
Plaintiffs object to defendant's "Statement of Facts" 
as set forth in its two briefs on file herein on grounds that 
the Statements are argumentative, that they set forth as 
facts material which is not in the record, or is contra-
dicted by the record or is taken out of context and made 
misleading thereby. This honorable Court is urged to 
make a careful study of the record before relying on any 
such statements. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE T'RIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DIS-
CRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANT'-RBSFON- t;4PPct..t-AN1· 
:QEN~'& MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT. 
THE RECORD DISCLOSES THAT ANY OTHER 
HOLDING WOULD CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE 
ERROR. 
Competing philosophies of law are always presented 
when a Court is asked to set aside a default judgment. 
On the one hand it is said that defaults are not favored in 
the law because they prevent the defaulted party from 
having his day in court. On the other hand, defaults 
serve a socially desirable purpose because they permit 
the business of the community to progress to necessary: 
conclusions. 
An examination of the records in these cases will re-
veal to this Court that the action of the Trial Court below 
in sustaining the defaults was not as harsh as might be 
supposed and jn fact was well deserved. The defendant 
corporation has been guilty of financial and business ir-
responsibility for some time (see Statement of Facts, 
supra) which has not endeared it to thos.e who have had 
contractual and business relations with it. 
On March 31, 1961, the charter of the defendant cor-
poration was suspended by the State of Utah (Exhibit 1, 
both cases) and at the date of this writing that charter 
has not been reinstated or reactivated. The suspension of 
the charter occurred for failure to pay the annual license 
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taxes required by the state under the provisions of Sec. 
59-13-61, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. (Exhibit 1, both 
cases) As a result of that action, the defendant was 
prohibited by law from functioning or doing any business 
whatsoever (Sec. 59-13-61, supra), and further, any indi-
vidual who attempted to conduct business in the name of 
the corporation was subject to indictment for doing so. 
(Sec. 59-13-62, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, makes any 
such attempt an indictable misdemeanor.) 
In addition to the foregoing, the corporation was 
without management, had only two directors (Mr. R. J. 
Pinder and one other), was insolvent and is now in bank-
ruptcy proceedings, and was and is for all practical pur-
poses defunct. (See defendant's briefs: Case No. 9652, 
Pgs. 3, 10, 19; Case No. 9653, Pgs. 4, 11, 20.) The defen-
dant consistently failed to perform under its contracts 
with plaintiffs. (See Case No. 9653, R, Pgs. 19, 20; Case 
No. 9652, R, Pgs. 14, 15.) 
Defendant has attempted to delay and stall these 
plaintiffs at every turn, including before this honorable 
Court. This last was accomplished by not filing the record 
herein until the last possible mo1nent after receiving an 
extension from the Trial Court. Tlris, despite the relative 
brevity of the· record. 
As to the law of the case, a general statement of it is 
aptly set out in 3 Baron & Holtzo.ff, Fed. Practice and 
Procedwre, page 89, Sec. 1~17, Setting Aside Default: 
"A motion to set aside a default or a judg-
Inent h~T default is addressed to the diseretion of 
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the court, and an adequate basiJs for the motion 
must be shown. In exercising this discretion the 
court will be guided by the fact that default judg-
ments are not favored in the law. Courts exist to 
do justice, and are properly reluctant to lend 
their processes to the enforcement of an unjust 
judgment. At the same time, the rules which re-
quire responsive pleadings within a limited time 
serve important social goals, and a party should 
not be allowed to flaunt them with impunity. In 
balancing these policies, the court should not re-
open a default judgment merely because the party 
in default requests it, but should require the party 
to show that there was good reason for the default 
and that he has a meritor.ious defense to the ac-
tion. However, the fact that defendant has a me,ri-
torious defense does not justify setting the 
judgment aside if no good excuse for the default 
is shown. The merits of the controversy will not 
be considered unless an adequate reason for the 
default is shown." [Emphasis supplied] 
As an example of the emphasized portion of the fore-
going the·re is cited the case of U. S. vs. Edgewater Dye-
ing and Finishing Company, DC Pa. 1957, 21 F.R.D. 304 
in which it was held that where there was no allegation 
that the amount of the plaintiff's claim was not justly 
due contained in a motion to set aside the default, or else-
where, the motion was properly denied. 
The doctrine enunciated above has been followed by 
this court from its earliest days down through the adop-
tion of the new Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, patterned 
after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; this has been 
so from the case of Utah Commercial & Savings Bank vs. 
Tntmbow (1898) 17 Utah 198, 53 P. 1033 down to the case 
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of Ney vs. Harrvson (1956) 5 Utah 2d 217,299 P. 2d 1114. 
In Warren vs. Dixon Ranch Co. (1953) 123 Utah 416, 260 
P. 2d 741, decided under the new rules, Justice McDon-
ough, at page 419 of 123 Utah substantially paraphrases 
the above quoted language of Baron & Holtzoff to the 
same effect. 
Thus it may be seen that any defendant who seeks to 
set aside a default judgment must fulfill two require-
ments. First, he must show that on some statutory ground. 
he is entitled to set aside the default. He must make a 
showing that there has been the required neglect, mistake 
or other ground through the form of an affidavit attached 
to and filed in support of the motion. He must further 
show that he has a meritorious defense which, if the de-
fault vs set aside, will entitle him to be heard, and if true, 
will entitle him to judgment on the merits. 
It is not sufficient simply to state the conclusion that 
the movant has a meritorious defense; he must set forth 
that defense in detail and in such form that the other 
party would not be entitled to a motion to dismiss. 60 
C.J.S. 25, Motions and Orders, Sec. 23; Salt Lake City vs. 
Utah and S.alt Lake Canal Company (1913) 43 Utah 591, 
137 P. 638; vVarren VS. Di:ron R((J:Cll Co., supra. Here the 
defendant merely recited that it had been guilty of neglect 
and that it had a meritorious defense. But there is noth-
ing in the record to indicate what facts constituted neglect 
nor what facts and c.ircumsta;nces constituted a defense. 
The ultimate conclusion of the movant is obviously in-
sufficient. 
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In this particular case the defendant did neither. 
There were no affidavits filed in either case with the mo-
tion to set aside the default judgment which demonstrated 
excusable neglect or mistake or any other ground for set-
ting aside a default. In addition, no proposed answer was 
filed in the matter and of course there being no proposed 
answer, there was no showing of .any defense, meritorious 
or otherwise. In other words, at the time of the first 
hearing on the motion, March 7, 19'62, there was absolute;. 
ly nothing on which the Trial Court could base an order 
to set aside the default and the default judgment and the 
Court told defendant so. (Case No. 9652, R, Pg. 16; Case 
No. 9653, R, Pg. 21) The Court granted the defendant a 
week in which to file the necessary affidavits, proposed 
answers, or other documents that the defendant may wish 
to file in support of its motions to set aside the defaults. 
The hearing on the motion was set over to 2 :30 P. M., 
March 14, 1962. 
On March 14, 1962, the defendant served on plaintiff 
an affidavit in each case executed by one~ R. J. Pinder. 
However, it is plaintiffs' opinion, and obviously the opin-j 
ion of the Trial Court, that the affidavits did not contain 
the necessary requisites to show excuable neglect or mis-
take and did not show a meritorious defense. In our opin-
ion it discussed many extraneous matters not pertinent 
to the case at issue. Apparently the defendant felt the 
san1e way as it did not designate these affidavits for in-
clusion in the records. 
But it should he noted the Trial Court did have the 
benefit of the affidavits as well as all of the rest of the 
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record now before this Court and in addition, had the 
benefit of the arguments of defendant's counsel. With all 
of this before it the ·Trial Court still denied the motions 
to set aside the defaults. 
In Warren vs. Dt"xon Ranch Co. (1953) 123 Utah 416, 
260 P. 2d 741, 1fr. Justice McDonough, speaking for a 
unanimous court, stated at page 422 of 123 Utah as 
follows: 
"Appellants' conduct is not entirely inexcus-
able and the trial court could have, in its discre-
tion, set aside the judgment; but, on the other 
hand, respondent and the trial court were justified 
in believing that appellants had abandoned their 
defense. The rule that the courts will incline to-
ward granting relief to a party who has not had 
opportunity to present his case is ordinarily ap-
plied at the trial court level, and this court will 
not reverse the trial court where it appears (as 
here from the memorandum decision which is a 
part of the record) that all elements were con-
sidered, me,rely because the motion could have 
been granted. Thi:s court 1cill not substitute its 
discretvon for that of the trial court ,in a case su-ch 
as this." [Emphasis supplied] 
In the case of Ney vs. Harn;son (1956) 5 Utah 2d 217, 
299 P. 2d 1114 the trial court had granted a motion to 
set aside a default judgn1ent and one of the issues on 
appeal was whether it should have done so. This Court 
reaffirmed the, language of Warren vs. Dixon RaJZch Co., 
supra, and Mr. Justice Crockett, speaking for a unani-
mous court stated at page 220 of 5 Utah 2d as follows: 
" ... The Utah decisions relied upon by plain-
tiff recognize the finnly established principle that 
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it is largely within the discretion of the trial court 
whether a default should be relieved, which dis-
cretion will not be· disturbed unless there is a 
patent abuse thereof." [Emphasis supplied] 
In the two cases before the Court there is absolutely 
nothing in the record to show any abuse of discretion 
whatsoe,ver. In point' of fact there is nothing in the 
record which lends even a color of right to the request 
made by defendants to set aside the judgments. The trial 
court recognized this and gave defendant's counsel ad-
ditional time in which to correct these defects. This it 
did not do. It has no right now to complain of abuse of 
discretion at the Trial Court level. There is nothing in 
the record on which the 'Trial Court could base a ruling 
in defendant's favor. The judgment must be affirmed. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT HAD AND HAS JURISDICTION 
OVER THE DE'FENDANT CORPORATION. 
The record in both cases, when examined carefully, 
shows that there, is no defect in the· service of summons. 
It shows that the president of Standard Gilsonite, R. J. 
Pinder, purportedly resigned only two weeks prior to 
service upon him in these cases. His resignation came 
after the Beaver Dam Sales Company· suit had been filed 
against the company. Service had been attempted prior 
to January 18th by the Sheriff of Salt Lake County with-
out success. I-Iowever, Mr. Pinder knew that service was 
being attempted upon him. At the time of his purported 
resignation there was only one other director, if we are to 
believe defendant's briefs (Case X o. 9652, Pg. 21; Case 
~ o. 9653, Pg. 22) or at the most, two other directors. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
(Case No. 9653, R, Pg. 27) "There were no officers or 
directors legally qualified in the State of Utah.'' (Defen-
dant's Briefs, Pg. 10) There was no one legally authorized 
to accept the resignation of Mr. Pinder. The Board of 
Directors was not properly constituted and was not pro-
perly meeting. (Case No. 9653, R, Pg. 28, lines 11 to 15) 
Mr. Pinder seems to have recognized this because he also 
submitted his resignation to a "principal creditor and 
stockholder". (Case No. 9653, R, Pg. 23, line 22 and Pg. 
24, line 1) 
Notwithstanding Pinder's purported resignation, 
after he was served on February 1st, he advised a "group 
of interested stockholders" of the fact of service who, in 
turn, contacted the law firm of Jensen, Jensen & Brad-
ford on February 16, 1962 "in order to determine what 
could be done to protect the corporation.'' (Defendant's 
Briefs, both cases, Pgs. 3, 4) These attorneys attempted 
to get in touch with Mr. Pinder, it is said, in order to 
"obtain the necessary information with which to protect 
the corporation against the complaint herein involved." 
(Defendant's Briefs, Pg. 4) Apparently contacting Mr. 
Pinder was simpler for his attorneys than it was for his 
creditors because they found him on the very same day. 
(Defendant's Briefs, Pg. 4) He and his attorney con-
tacted by long distance telephone certain other share-
holders (while the word "other" does not appear in the 
briefs, we can only assume such was the case since the 
attorneys were initially contacted by one group of share-
holders) and obtained authority to represent the defen-
dant corporation. In other words, ~Ir. Pinder continued 
to be active in the organization and attempted to obtain 
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representation for the purp·ose of defending hims,elf and 
the corporation. He was successful in doing so on the 
16th day of February, 1962, a full week before the default 
judgment was taken. 
A rather good summary of the law in this area is 
found at 19 CJS 999, Corporations, Sec. 1316 as follows: 
''Resignation of Officer. Service on an officer 
who has eff.ected a valid resignation is inopera-
tive, although plaintiff does not believe in the bona 
fides of the resignation; hut where the resignation 
of a corporate officer has never been acted on and 
he continues to discharge his duties as officer, the 
corporation cannot, after he has been served by 
parties having no knowledge that his resignation 
has been tendered, assert that he resigned prior 
to the service. In the: ,absence of an acceptance of 
the resignat~on, the incumbent contt~es as am 
officer .de facto on whom service may be made; 
but if notice of the resignation is given, and there 
are other officers on whom service· may he made, 
the acceptance of the resignation becomes imma-
terial. A fraudulent resignation to preiVent service 
of process will not invalidate a service on the 
officer who has attempted to resign. In case the 
by-laws or articles of incorporation prov~de that 
an officer shall hold until his successor ~s elected, 
servioe may be had on an officer who has resvgned 
until the corporatiJon elects his successor; hut 
there is some authority to the contrary." [Em-
phasis supplied] 
It is stipulated by the defendant at page 21 of both 
its briefs that the corporate charter and by-laws of defen-
dant provide that an officer shall hold office until a 
successor is appointed. Consequently, under the rule of 
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law enunciated above, Mr. Pinder continued as an officer 
of the corporation until after February 1, 1962, and if the 
situation has not changed, he is still an officer. Oases so 
holding are Ross vs. Western Land & Irrig,ation Co., 223 
F. 680; Venner vs. Denver Union Water Company, 40 
Colo. 212, 90 P. 623, 122 Am. St. R. 1036; Colorado Deben-
ture Corporation vs. Lombar,d Investment Company, 66 
Kansas 251, 71 P. 584, 97 Am. St. R., 373; Freidenberg 
vs. Lee Construction Co1npany, 27 Misc. 651, 58 NYS 391; 
Timolat vs. S. J. Held Company, 17 Misc. 556, 40 NYS 
692; Parker vs. Bethel Hotel Company, 96 Tenn. 252, 34 
SW 209; 31 LRA 706; the only case to the contrary which 
we have been able to find is Western Pattern and lJf_ anu-
facturing Co. vs. American Metal Shoe Company, 175 
Wis. 493, 185 NW 535, 20 ALR 264. This case seems to be 
clearly contrary to the weight of authority. (See annota-
tion following the report of the case at 20 ALR 267, page 
269). 
See also the language contained in Warren vs. Dixon 
Ranch Co., s~tpra at 123 Utah, page 421 which indicates 
that the authority of the officers of a corporation to re-
ceive service of process continues after that corporation 
has been suspended. The charter of the Di..xon Ranch Co. 
was suspended in exactly the same n1anner and for exact-
ly the same reason as was the charter of Standard Gil-
sonite Company, defendant herein. 
If the la-w Vi7 erc not as outlined above, it would be 
relatively si1nple for a Utah eorporation with finaneial 
problen1s to avoid a legal deter1nination of its rights and 
duties. It would simply fail to pay its state franehise tax 
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and when its charter was suspended, all of its officers 
would resign. Thus service of process would be impos-
sible. The law never contemplated such a situation and 
has avoided it as indicated. 
Based upon the stipulations and admissions of coun-
sel and the law as above set forth, there is no question 
but that Mr. Pinder was the authorized agent to receive 
service of process for the company as a matter of law and' 
that the service upon him as president of the company 
was perfectly proper. It follows that the court clearly 
had jurisdiction over the defendant at the time the de-
fault judgments were entered. 
But jurisdiction over the defendant rests on more 
than mere personal service. After the entry of the de-
faults and judgments, defendant filed motions in each of 
the two cases which were similiar except for the captions. 
These motions moved the Court to set aside the default 
and the judgment and decree entered in each of the cases : 
(Case No. 9653, R, Pg. 58) " ... pursuant to Rule. 
56( c) and Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P. for the reason tha;t 
because of mistake, inadvertance and excusable 
neglect, defendant failed to file a timely answer 
in said cause, and for the further reason that said 
defendant has meritorious defenses and setoffs 
in said cause·, and that defendant has not been 
properly served with summons as required by 
law." 
(Case No. 9652, R, Pg. 25) " ... pursuant to Rule 
56( c) and Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P. for the reason that 
because of mistake, inadvertence and excusable 
neglect, defendant failed to file a timely answer 
to the complaint and amended complaint in said 
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cause and the further reasons that said defendant 
was not properly se,rved with summons in said 
cause and that said defendant has valid and meri-
torious defenses and setoffs in said cause.'' 
The law is clear that a motion phrased in such 
language constitutes a general appearance subjecting the 
movant to the jurisdiction of the court. Clawson vs. 
Boston Acme Mt'nes Development Company (1928) 72 
Utah 137, 269 P. 147, 59 ALR 1318; 6 CJS 32, Appear-
ances, Sec. 12 (g) (2); 31 ALR 2d 262 at page 268. The 
only time a movant challenges the jurisdiction of the 
court is when he limits his motion strictly to that issue. 
If he joins the jurisdictional ground with a non-jurisdic-
tional ground in a motion to set aside a default, he is then 
held to have made a general appearance. Clawson vs. 
Boston Acme Mtnes Development Company, supra; 6 
CJS 32, Appearances, Sec. 12 (g) (2); 31 ALR 2d 262 at 
page 269. 
We call the Court's attention to the annotation in 
31 ALR 2d 262 at page 280 where under Sections. 11 and 
12 it is stated that language such as that contained in de-
fendant's motions are construed as general appearances. 
Section 11 states: 
"An allegation, in a motion for the vacation 
of a judg1nent or order, to the effect that the 
1novant has a good, n1eritorious, or substantial 
defense against the action, is usually held to con-
stitute a general appearance." 
Section 12 states: 
''l\f.otions to vacate a judgment or order on 
the ground of 1nistake, inadvertence, accident, sur-
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prise or excusable neglect, have generally been 
held to operate as a general appearance." 
Consequently, it may be seen that regardless of the 
quality of the service, the court has jurisdiction of this 
defendant and that the judgment will not fall on that 
ground. 
POINT III. 
THE DEFAUIJT JUDGMENT AS ENTERED BY 
THE 'TRIAL COURT IS PERFECTLY CONSISTENT 
WITH THE LAW PERTAINING'TO ILLEGALITY OF 
CONTRACTS AND SHOULD BE SUSTAINED. 
The tenor of defendant's brief in Point III clearly 
indicates that his counsel does not comprehend the basis 
of the relief granted by the decision of the Trial Court. 
A brief review of the situation will apprise the Court of 
what transpired and help the Court and defendant to 
understand the judgment as entered. 
The subject matter of the contracts in both cases are 
patents, or patent applications, which, at the time of the 
execution of the contracts, were to be issued to E. J. 
Mayhew. The patents in each instance were so-called 
"Process Patents"; i.e., they covered the use of a certain 
quality and size of gilsonite particles in a process to he 
utilized by oil drillers. 
Gilsonite of the size and specification called for by 
the patented process is not, in and of itself, patentable. 
Consequently, any producer of gilsonite of the kind and 
size called for under the patent could legitimately and 
properly sell his gilsonite to a person who was licensed 
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by the holder of the process patent to utilize the process. 
Under the contract between Standard Gilsonite Company 
and Beaver Dam Sales Company involved in Case No. 
9653, the Oourt will observe that an exclusive license was 
given hy Beaver Dam Sales Company, the owner of the 
process patent concerned in that case, to Standard Gil-
sonite Company. Collaterally with that exclusive license 
was given the right to sub-license. (Case No. 9653, Ex-
hibit 2) The contract further went on to provide that 
Standard Gilsonite Company would bag its gilsonite of a 
certain grade and kind and would sell it. Whoever would 
buy the gilsonite would automatically receive a license to 
use the process patent. (See page 3, Exhibit 2) The con-
tract then called for the defendant to pay a royalty to 
Beaver Dam equal to 3¥2% of the sales price received 
from the sale of gilsonite. Incidentally, in refutation of 
the defendant's claim that plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney 
drew the contract, an examination of Exhibit 2 will reveal 
that the agreement was dra'vn on the stationery of Irving 
fl. Biele, attorney, and that Mr. Biele was the secretary 
of Standard Gilsonite Company at that time. 
An examination of the contract in the other case be-
tween Mayhew and the defendant indicates that instead of 
granting defendant an exclusive license, Mayhew actually 
assigned the patent to the defendant with a provision that 
the patent would be reassigned in the event of a default. 
Such reassignment was to be executed by defendant and 
placed in escrovv with an escrow agent. It was then con-
templated by the agremnent that defendant would sell 
gilsonite for use in the patented process and would grant 
a license to the user thereof upon the purchase of the 
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gilsoni te. (Case No. 9652, R, page 14, lines 20 to 29) 
Again, the agreement contemplated that Standard would 
sell gilsonite and grant a license to the user and the only 
way that Mayhew would receive any royalty was from 
the sale of such gilsonite. The Court will notice in exam-
ining Exhibit 2 in Case No. 9652 (Mayhew-Standard 
case) that the contract was also drawn on the stationery 
of J\1r .. Biele who was still acting as attorney for Stan-
dard Gilsonite Company. 
It will he seen from the foregoing that both contracts 
contemplated that the defendant, Standard Gilsonite 
Cmnpany, would sell gilsonite to the ultimate user and at 
the same time, being the owner or exclusive licensee, of 
the patent, would license the user to utilize the patent 
with the particular gilsonite sold to it. Thus the granting 
of a license to use the patents was tied to the sale of 
gilsonite, an unpatented and unpatentable product. It is 
this application of the patent to the· sale of gilsonite 
which is illegal and which the court found violated the 
provisions of Title 15, United States Code, and particu-
larly Section 14 thereof. (See Leitch Manufacturing 
Compa.ny vs. Ba.rber Comparny, 302 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 
288, 82 L. Ed. 371; B. B. Chemical Company v.s. Ellis, 314 
U.S. 495, 62 S. Ct. 406, 86 L. Ed. 367; Morton Salt Com-
pany vs. G. S. Suppvger Company, 314 U. S. 488, 62 S. Ct. 
402, 86 L. Ed. 363.) 
The essential illegality of the contract arose out of 
the dealings between Standard Gilsonite Company and 
third parties, in that Standard Gilsonite Company was 
violating the anti-trust laws by tying the sale of an un-
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patentable product to the licensing of a patent. Needless 
to say, the significance of the fact that the transactions 
took place in interstate commerce, which seemed to baffle 
defendant's counsel (Defendant's brief, Case Nu. 9652, 
pg. 26), is that unless the sales were in interstate com-
merce the federal anti-trust law would not be applicable. 
All of the foregoing merely illustrates that neither 
the assignment of the patent to defendant nor the grant-
ing of an exclusive license under the patent to defendant 
was, in and of itself, illegal. Consequently, the plaintiffs 
and defendant were not in pari delicto. The illegality 
arose out of the fact that the plaintiffs could not receive 
any consideration from the exploitation of their patent 
unless the defendant entered into illegal arrangements 
with third parties. The suits brought were partly pre-
dicated upon the concept that such an arrangement was 
illegal, void and unenforceable as it pertained to defen-
dant and consequently should be terminated and the 
patents which were the subject of the contracts should be 
returned to their rightful owners free of encumbrances. 
There is ample authority for this relief in the law. 
At 17 CJS, 656; Contracts, Sec. :27:2. et seq there is a 
discussion of the enforceability of illegal contracts. The 
broad general authorities cited in Part III of defendant's 
briefs is supported in its generality by the early passages 
of that ·work. IIowever, it is puinted out that there are 
1nyriads of exceptions to the general precepts stated in 
appellant's briefs. At 17 C.J.S. 666, See. :27S(b) is the 
following: 
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''The complaining party is especially pro-
tected by the law where the agreement is not 
illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the 
prohibition was intended for his protection, and in 
such case, not being in pari delicto, he is entitled 
to relief, but only the party whom the law was 
designed to protect can take advantage of it. The 
fact that the penalty is ~mpose:d on one of the 
partves .alone shows cle.arly that the law does not 
consider them in pari .delvcto, unless the prohibited 
act would be illegal irre·spective of the statute ... " 
[Emphasis supplied] 
It is apparent from the law that any party desiring 
to avail hilnself of his rights under the anti-trust laws 
would proceed against defendant Standard Gilsonite 
Company. It is the use of the patents to sell gilsonite 
which is frowned upon. The injury flows to the user or 
the competitor. No liability would attach to eithe·r of the 
plaintiffs in this case, who are merely entitled to royalties 
based upon the use of their patent. Consequently, it can 
be seen that the penalty is imposed only upon the defen-. 
dant in this case and not upon either of the plaintiffs. It 
follows that the law would not consider the two parties in 
pari delicto. 
Si1nilarly it will he noted that the relief entered in 
both cases merely clears the plaintiffs' titles and does not 
require anything more than that the defendant relinquish 
any residual rights it might have had under the contracts 
with respect to the patents and cease utilizing the patents 
to further its sales of gilsonite in any way. It does not 
prevent defendant from selling its gilsonite, which, when 
i.t was operating, was ostensibly its principal business. 
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Even if the contract itself were tainted, the relief 
granted is clearly proper. Again we refer to the section 
on Contracts in 17 CJS 664 (Sec. 276). 
"Under these principles, it has been held that 
... the rule that no particeps criminis can maintain 
an action founded on an illegal or immoral con-
tract does not prohibit the vendor of land, where 
the sale is illegal and the conveyance void, from 
recovering the land, as he recovers it by vtnue of 
his prior untainted legal title, .agaimst whrich de-
fend.ant cannot set up a tvtle void by law." 
See also Wooden vs. Shotwell, 23 N.J. Law 465, 
affirmed 24 N.J. Law 789. 
It may thus be seen that the Trial Oourt had ample 
authority in law and equity to enter the judgment which 
it did. In its sound discretion, the Court properly did not 
feel justified in setting aside that judgment when there 
was nothing before the Court to justify such an action. 
The argument that plaintiffs are retaining the spoils 
of an illegal contract is equally without merit. Defendant 
only paid for what it -received as it received it. To the 
extent any monie·s had been paid by defendant under the 
contracts, it had value received therefor. Apart from the 
illegality question, defendant had been in default under 
the contracts. The contracts were sought by defendant 
and drawn by its counsel to its specifications. It has 
failed to promote or exploit the patents, either legally 
or illegally. 
The relief granted hy the Trial Court was proper, 
legal and equitable and should stand as granted. 
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CONCLUSION 
As can be seen from the records and defendant's 
briefs in these cases, Standard Gilsonite Company has all 
but passed from the economic scene. Counsel for the com-
pany assert that "a group of interested stockholders" are 
trying to rehabilitate· it, but plaintiffs have been so ad-
vised for years. 
This defendant has not arrived at its present state of 
despair over night. To one familiar with the management 
of business affairs, it is quite apparent that a business of 
the size of defendant arrived at the point of insolvency 
only after a period of long mismanagement. We know 
that some two and a half years ago it lost its legally con-
stituted board of directors, under which it must legally 
operate. We know, also, that somewhere along the line it 
lost its capital, or it would not be insolvent today; and 
that its corporate charter has been suspended for well 
over a year. 
This corporate ecdysiast has not shorn itself of all 
means of conducting its business without injury to its 
creditors, busine·ss associates and others. Plaintiffs have 
fe1t the cold shoulder of fickle promises and have been 
stood up at the financial altar on more than one occasion. 
They have been tantalized into parting with cherished 
possessions by promises of blissful economic union. And 
they have had their glorious dreams shattered when the 
promising defendant proved to be economically impotent. 
Now plaintiffs, stung by the cold air of economic 
reality, have sought only their freedom from this un-
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happy affair, sans alimony. But the defendant, using 
every wile known to it, seeks to prolong the union as 
though it were its last. 
The Trial Court granted plaintiffs their freedom. 
Upon supplication by the defendant, affecting an air of 
injured innocence, the Court twice re-examined the ques-
tion, all the while exhorting defendant to supply it with 
reasons why the parties should remain together. None 
were forthcoming, because, indeed, there are none. 
There is no reason, legal, equitable or moral, why 
this defendant, while in the throes of death, should be 
allowed to emasculate plaintiffs in the prime of their 
economic life. Further delay to plaintiffs could well re-
sult in that very emasculation. 
The orders and judgments should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Moyle & Moyle 
by Hardin A. Whitney, Jr. 
810 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Pla~"ntiffs-Respon.dents 
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